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Abstract 
 
This paper adopts the mid-1990s Delaware antitakeover regime shift as a natural 
experiment to examine how the removal of hostile takeover threats affects managers’ 
decisions on corporate financing and investment, and how it impacts on firm value. 
Our Differences-in-Differences-in-Differences analysis shows that, consistent with 
managerial agency models of capital structure and the free cash flow hypothesis of 
Jensen (1986), managers use lower debt financing and make higher capital 
expenditures and corporate acquisitions when protected from takeovers. These 
entrenched behaviors destroy firm value. In addition, we find the impacts of the 
exogenous changes in market control are more significant for firms with lower 
managerial ownerships or lower institutional holdings, lending supports to the 
arguments of Jensen (1993) that effective internal control systems can alleviate the 
negative impacts of weakened capital market controls.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper adopts the Delaware’s mid-1990s antitakeover regime shift as a 
natural experiment to study how takeover impediments affect managers’ decisions on 
corporate financing and investment, and ultimately how it impacts on firm value. 
Due to the separation of ownership and control in corporations, managers may 
not work in the best interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Consequently, there are managerial agency costs; managers make sub-optimal 
corporate financing and investment decisions to maximize their own private benefits.  
On one hand, in the literature of corporate financing, models of capital structures with 
managerial entrenchment predict that entrenched managers have incentives to use less 
debt than that is optimal for shareholders (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1982; Stulz, 1990; 
and Hart and Moore, 1995). The reason is because lower debt obligations of coupon 
payments and principles lead to lower chances of bankruptcy as well as higher free 
cash flows at managers’ discretion. On the other hand, in the literature of corporate 
investment, Jensen (1986)’s agency theory of free cash flows predicts that entrenched 
managers have incentives to over-invest in activities of empire-building and corporate 
diversification. Both lines of research imply that the use of debt can discipline 
managers. Therefore, if a manager is able to choose debt policy totally at his wish, he 
/ she will choose a low debt level. However, managers are also disciplined by hostile 
takeover threats as argued by Jensen (1993). If a manager does not do a competent job, 
the firm can be targeted by potential buyers and the manager could be replaced during 
the acquisition process. Considering this, a manager may voluntarily take on debt to 
defend hostile takeovers. Indeed, Zwiebel (1996), Novaes (2003) and Morellec (2004) 
construct models in which managers use debt not because it benefits shareholders but 
because it reduces the threat of a hostile takeover. Therefore, managers’ incentives to 
use debt and to invest in empire-building activities should change with the 
antitakeover environment. In a takeover-friendly jurisdiction, managers should use a 
higher debt and decrease inefficient investment, which consequently boosts firm value.  
Conversely, if changes in state laws shield firms from takeover threats, managers 
should reduce the use of debt and increase corporate investment, which further will 
destroy firm value.  
The Delaware’s mid-1990s validation of the poison pill in conjunction with a 
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staggered board completely immunes Delaware firms with a staggered board from 
hostile takeovers. It provides a natural experiment along with a natural control sample 
of non-Delaware firms and Delaware firms without staggered boards to test the 
implications of the models of capital structure with managerial entrenchment and 
Jensen (1986)’s agency theory of free cash flows. In particular, this paper aims to 
answer the following questions.  
• How do exogenous changes in antitakeover legal environment affect the 
managers’ incentives to use debt for self-discipline? 
• If takeover impediments lead to a reduction in the use of debt, how do 
corporate managers accordingly change their corporate investment decisions? 
• What are the implications on firm value? 
In addition, Jensen (1993) argues that effective internal control systems such as high 
managerial ownerships and high institutional holdings can mitigate the negative 
impacts of weakened capital market controls such as hostile takeover threats and debt 
disciplines. On one hand, if managers have higher stakes in a firm, their incentives 
can be more in lined with shareholders’. On the other hand, institutional investors are 
active investors and they typically exert more monitoring efforts on managers. With 
these said, in this paper, we also aim to shed lights on the following question. 
• Are the impacts of takeover impediments more pronounced among firms with 
weaker internal control systems before the antitakeover regime shift? 
The case of the Delaware’s mid-1990s antitakeover regime shift has been 
discussed from law perspective by Gilson (2001), Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian 
(2002) and Subranmanian (2004). Rauh (2006) and Low (2009) among others use it 
as an exogenous shock to study the implications of corporate governance on employee 
ownership used in defined contribution plans and managerial risk-taking behaviors, 
respectively. Before 1995, Delaware had friendly takeover laws. Delaware Supreme 
Court was not in favor of the target’s poison pill and allowed shareholders to decide 
for themselves whether to accept a hostile bid. Without poison pill, staggered board 
structure would be just like “emperor’s new clothes”. This friendly takeover 
landscape changed markedly in 1995. The Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling in Moore 
Corp Ltd vs. Wallace Computer Services (1995) legitimized the combination of 
 - 3 -
staggered board and the pill. Since then, Delaware firms with staggered boards have 
had a “Just Say No” defense to hostile takeover bids (Wall Street Journal, 1996, 1997). 
Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian (2002) find that not a single hostile bidder 
managed to win control against a target with an effective staggered board in the 
five-year period from 1996 to 2000. In addition, Rauh (2006) shows a decrease in the 
probability of takeover for Delaware firms after 1996. Subramanian (2004) argues 
that the series of takeover events have eliminated Delaware’s distinctiveness as a 
takeover-friendly jurisdiction.  
    We adopt a Differences-in-Differences-in-Differences approach (triple-difference 
or DDD specification) to measure the impact of the exogenous changes in the 
Delaware’s antitakeover legal environment since there are three levels of 
“differences”: Delaware vs. non-Delaware, staggered board vs. non-staggered board, 
and before vs. after the Delaware’s antitakeover regime shift in 1995. This type of 
specification is common in the labor economics and public finance literature (e.g., 
Gruber, 1994), and has been applied by Rauh (2006) and Low (2009) to corporate 
finance. Because the “Just Say No” defense is effective only for the Delaware firms 
with a staggered board (protected firms) but not for the non-Delaware firms and 
Delaware firms without a staggered board (unprotected firms), the latter groups 
naturally serve as a control group. Our main findings are summarized as follows. 
With regard to the impacts on corporate financing, as predicted by the 
managerial agency models of capital structure, we find that managers reduce the use 
of debt when shielded from antitakeover threats. Our empirical analysis shows that 
the protected firms reduce leverage ratios by 0.9 percentage points more than the 
unprotected firms after the antitakeover regime shift. Such reduction accounts for 
3.4% of the sample mean of leverage ratios of the whole sample before the regime 
shift. These results are robust after we control for financing adjustment costs and 
factors that differentiate the trade-off or pecking order theories of capital structure.  
As to corporate investment, with weakened market control and discipline by debt, 
we find that managers make higher corporate investments and engage in more merger 
and acquisition activities. Our empirical analysis shows that the protected firms 
increase their ratio of capital expenditure to book assets by 0.7 percentage points more 
than the unprotected firms after the antitakeover regime shift. This number is both 
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statistically and economically significant considering it accounts for more than 10% 
of the sample average of capital expenditure to assets ratio of the whole sample before 
the regime shift. Furthermore, consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen 
(1986), we find that the over-investment behaviors are more significant for firms with 
high cash holdings and low growth opportunities.  
    About implications on firm value, we find that the sub-optimal decisions on 
corporate financing and investment destroy firm value. In particular, Tobin’s Q of 
protected firms is reduced by 14 to 16 percentage points more than the unprotected 
firms after the antitakeover regime shift. This is economically significant given the 
sample mean of Tobin’s Q of the whole sample before the regime shift is 1.56.  
Finally, to test Jensen (1993)’s views that effective internal control systems can 
serve as remedies of weak capital market controls, we sort firms based on the average 
managerial or institutional holdings before the antitakeover regime shift and examine 
whether the impact of takeover impediments is more significant for the group with 
low managerial or institutional holdings. We find supportive results. 
Our paper is related to two strands of empirical studies of managerial 
entrenchment, i.e. entrenched managers’ corporate financing decisions and their 
corporate investment decisions. We contribute to the existent literature by mitigating 
the endogeneity problem and by improving the measurement of anti-takeover 
protection. On the empirical studies of entrenched managers’ corporate financing 
decisions, the results have been mixed. Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) draw from 
cross-sectional evidence and conclude that entrenched managers on average adopt 
lower level of leverage ratios. Safieddine and Titman (1996) find that targets that 
successfully defend takeover offers significantly increase their leverage ratios. Just the 
opposite, John and Litov (2009) find that firms with entrenched managers, who are 
less vulnerable to takeovers as measured by the Gompers et al. (2003) entrenchment 
index, actually use more debt financing and have higher leverage ratios.  
Along the empirical studies of entrenched managers’ corporate investment 
decisions, Gompers et al. (2003) construct an entrenchment index to characterize the 
strength of shareholder rights across firms and show that well protected firms with 
higher governance index have higher amount of capital expenditures and corporate 
acquisitions. Using entrenchment indexes developed by Gompers et al. (2003) and 
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Bebchuk et al. (2008) and measures of shareholder oversight, Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that entrenched managers destroy firm value through 
dissipating cash on assets with low accounting returns.  
The above mentioned empirical studies focus on cross-sectional inferences 
which could be challenged by the endogeneity of corporate governance decisions to 
corporate financing and investment decisions. Exogenous changes in state law of 
antitakeover are a more useful source of identifying variation than cross sectional 
entrenchment indexes and other firm or executive characteristics. We, therefore, 
contribute to the literature by mitigating the endogeneity problem. In a related paper, 
Garvey and Hanka (1999) adopt the “second generation” state antitakeover laws in the 
period from 1987 to 1990 to show that the threat of hostile takeover motivates 
managers to take on debt they will otherwise avoid. We complement their study by 
providing further evidences on the relations of managerial entrenchment with 
corporate investment decisions and firm value, and by shedding some lights on Jensen 
(1993)’s arguments that effective internal control systems can serve as remedies of 
weak capital market controls.  In addition, our use of the Delaware’s mid-1990s 
antitakeover regime shift forms a better nature-experiment setting in that this regime 
shift was taken into effect within a very short period of time. In contrast, the second 
generation antitakeover laws were applied by different states in different years; the 
time period spanned from 1987 to 1990 making it difficult to draw cross-sectional 
comparisons. Furthermore, in many states, several second-generation laws were 
passed within a short period of time. Given this clustering of new legislation and the 
persistence of ownership from one year to the next, simultaneous identification of the 
effects of each of the individual legal measures on both takeover probabilities and 
corporate financing and investment decisions proves difficult. Moreover, the 
effectiveness of the second generation state antitakeover laws is questioned by 
Comment and Schwert (1995) who find little evidence that these laws reduced the 
frequency of takeovers. 
In addition, we contribute to the existent literature by improving the 
measurement of anti-takeover protection. The existent papers have used firm-level 
entrenchment index developed by Gompers et al. (2003) and/or Bebchuk et al. (2008). 
Both indexes are primarily based on a count of charter provisions that reduce 
managerial vulnerability to takeovers. These indexes could suffer the measurement 
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errors and the empirical results based on them could be biased if the measurement 
errors are not random. Indeed, Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) have questioned the 
ability of Gompers et al. (2003) index to capture antitakeover protection. In contrast, 
the Delaware’s mid-1990s validation of the poison pill in conjunction with a staggered 
board provides managers of Delaware firms with a staggered board an extremely 
effective defense against hostile bidders.  
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the case of the 
mid-1990s Delaware antitakeover ruling. Section 3 develops testable hypotheses. 
Section 4 describes the sample and the empirical methodology. Sections 5 and 6 
present the main empirical findings and the further analyses, respectively. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. Case introduction 
In this study, the natural experiment is formed based on the case of mid-1990s 
Delaware antitakeover regime shift, which is symbolized by the court ruling of Moore 
Corp Ltd vs. Wallace Computer Services (1995). This case is discussed from law 
perspective by Gilson (2001), Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian (2002) and 
Subranmanian (2004), and is used by Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), Rauh (2006) and 
Low (2009) among others to study the implications of corporate governance. In 1995, 
Delaware Supreme Court validated the poison pill in conjunction with a staggered 
board, which completely immunes Delaware firms with a staggered board from 
hostile takeovers. We give a brief introduction to the use of staggered board and 
poison pill as well as the case below. 
A staggered board is a certain type of board structure adopted by many U.S. 
firms. Comparing to a unitary board, a staggered board stratifies the entire board into 
sub-classes and guarantees that only one class of directors can be replaced at each 
annual meeting. For example, the most common staggered board structure has three 
classes. It indicates that only one third of the directors can be replaced every year. A 
poison pill is a rights plan that entitles shareholders to dilute the value of the position 
of a bidder who acquires a large block.   
A staggered board or a poison pill alone cannot defend takeovers effectively. The 
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reason for a weak role of the poison pill lies in the redemption feature of the pill: if a 
hostile bidder foresees potential obstacles from the pill, he / she could first tender an 
offer to shareholders and induce them to replace the current board. In this case, the 
acquisition could be carried out smoothly after the new board is in place and discards 
the pill. Meanwhile, prior to the development and adoption of the poison pill defense, 
staggered boards were considered only a mild takeover defense because they did not 
impede the acquisition of a control block. The introduction and acceptance of the 
poison pill, however, transformed the market for control, considerably enhancing the 
antitakeover power of staggered boards (Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian, 2002). 
The reason is because the majority of board cannot be abolished at one single year, 
neither can the pill. It means that a bidder has to wait for at least two consecutive 
years to gain control power and revoke the pill. For one thing, waiting increases the 
bidder’s uncertainty in winning two successive elections to replace the board. For 
another, it is costly to the bidder because the first year offer is not revocable yet the 
bidder may find it not profitable to provide the same offer in the next year. Therefore, 
the combination of a staggered board and a poison pill is most effective to defend 
hostile takeovers. 
    Before the year of 1995, the pill cannot be used infinitely in Delaware as implied 
from the case of Unocal Corp. vs. Mesa Petroleum (1985) and the subsequent case of 
Moran vs. Household International Inc. (1985). In these cases, the Delaware Supreme 
Court applied a proportionality test to demonstrate that managers’ use of pill should 
be appropriate and proportional to the takeover threat. Since these cases, managers 
would fail to maintain the pill if incumbents lost their first election because such 
continuation of the pill was deemed as an abuse of entrenched power (Bebchuk, 
Coates and Subramanian, 2002). Under this situation, the staggered board structure 
would be no more like an “emperor’s new clothes”. 
    However, the ruling of Moore Corp. vs. Wallace Computer (1995) came as a 
turning point, which validated poison pill in conjunction with a staggered board. 
Wallace Computer successively defended itself against a hostile bid from Moore 
Corp., even though the company lost its first proxy contest and one third of its board 
was replaced. The Wallace case was so influential that the Delaware firms with a 
staggered board subsequently successfully defended hostile takeovers by adopting the 
poison pill, such as Pennzoil Company vs. Circon Corp. (1997). Bebchuk, Coates and 
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Subramanian (2002) find that not a single hostile bidder managed to win control 
against a target with an effective staggered board in the five-year period from 1996 to 
2000. The Wallace case essentially started a ‘Just Say No’ takeover defense for the 
Delaware firms with a staggered board (Wall Street Journal, 1996, 1997). 
In our experiment setting, protected firms are referred to as those incorporated in 
Delaware and have a staggered board structure. One may argue that whether a firm 
has a poison pill is also important, but Gilson (2001) indicate that the poison pill is 
very ubiquitous. Indeed, in our sample, nearly 70% of Delaware firms with a 
staggered board have pill provisions.1 Moreover, a firm can easily adopt a poison pill 
once Supreme Court validates the pill whenever facing a takeover threat even if the 
firm has no poison pill in its corporate charter. But, the board structure is relatively 
difficult to change once it is established. Therefore, the crucial point for an effective 
takeover protection for Delaware firms after the poison pill is validated in 1995 lies in 
whether a firm has a staggered board before the regime shift. 
 
3. Hypothesis 
In this section, we develop our main testable hypotheses. 
3.1. Corporate financing, investment and firm value 
Models of capital structures with managerial entrenchment predict that 
entrenched managers have incentives to use less debt than that is optimal for 
shareholders (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1982; Stulz, 1990; and Hart and Moore, 1995). 
The reason is because lower debt obligations of coupon payments and principles lead 
to lower chances of bankruptcy (Fama, 1980) as well as higher free cash flows at 
managers’ discretion (Jensen, 1986). The existent empirical results have been mixed. 
Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) draw from cross-sectional evidence and conclude 
that entrenched managers on average adopt lower level of leverage ratios. The 
entrenchment measure in their study is proxied by long CEO tenure and low executive 
holdings. Safieddine and Titman (1996) find that targets that successfully defend 
takeover offers significantly increase their leverage ratios. Just the opposite, John and 
Litov (2009) find that firms with entrenched managers, who are less vulnerable to 
                                                        
1 The proportion is close to Bebchuk and Cohen (2004).  
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takeovers as measured by the Gompers et al. (2003) entrenchment index, actually use 
more debt financing and have higher leverage ratios. 
However, managers are also disciplined by hostile takeover threats as argued by 
Jensen (1993). If a manager does not do a competent job, the firm can be targeted by 
potential buyers and the manager could be replaced during the acquisition process. 
Considering this, a manager may voluntarily take on debt to defend hostile takeovers. 
Indeed, Zwiebel (1996), Novaes (2003) and Morellec (2004) construct models in 
which managers use debt not because it benefits shareholders but because it reduces 
the threat of a hostile takeover. All these models also imply that if exogenous shocks 
shield firms from antitakeover threats, then managers will have the incentive to 
reduce the discipline of debt. So, our first hypothesis is:  
H1a. After the 1995 ruling, Delaware firms with a staggered board will reduce the 
use of debt and thus decrease leverage ratios. 
 
Another feature of entrenched managements is that they tend to undertake 
wasteful projects that may not beneficial to shareholder. The incentive of inefficient 
investments may come from two channels. It reduces manager’s risk by constructing a 
diversified investment portfolio, and it enables managers to gain job security from 
empire building. The relationship between investment and level of entrenchment is 
tested by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), in which they find that capital 
expenditure is higher for firms with poor corporate governance, with other things 
equal. On the other hand, agency cost of investment could be reflected by profitability 
of projects. For example, Titman, Wei and Xie (2004) show that discretionary 
investments are always associated with negative stock market return, since investors 
interpret such investments as means of empire building. Also, Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that dollar value of cash holding decreases among firms with 
high managerial entrenchment, as entrenched mangers dissipate cash quickly on less 
profitable projects. 
    With market discipline managers may not engage in value-destroying projects, 
whereas without it, agency cost from investments could be more severe. Pugh, Page 
and Jahera (1992) use event study to show that antitakeover amendment protects 
managers from corporate control, the adoption of which leads to increase in capital 
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investment and R&D expense while other things being equal. Moreover, by studying 
shift of state law, Low (2009) notices that firms’ unsystematic risk is reduced when 
firms are protected by antitakeover provision. It provides further evidence to show 
diversification purpose of entrenched management. As a result, after the change of 
Delaware takeover environment, we expect:  
H1b. After the 1995 ruling, Delaware firms with a staggered board will increase 
corporate investments compared to the control group. 
 
By assuming that there exists an optimal level of leverage according to firm’s 
financing cost structure, a conservative debt policy of entrenched managers is not 
beneficial to the value of shareholders. The similar argument holds if one assumes the 
existence of optimal investment level, after balancing the firm’s cash flow capacity 
and investment opportunities. Consequently, it is natural to see whether entrenchment 
management is associated with value destroying. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), 
Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) and Faleye (2007) all show that a relative lower value is 
related to firms with high entrenchment index. 
    Previously, the impact of antitakeover provisions on shareholder value is not 
conclusive. On the positive side, it increases the bargaining power of target firm 
during acquisition and thus raises takeover premium for the sellers (Comment and 
Schwert, 1995). Also, the removal of takeover threats promises job security to 
incumbents, eliminating managerial myopia and enabling managers to emphasize long 
term corporate strategy (Stein, 1988). In contrast, antitakeover provisions may hurt 
investors as it leads to a more entrenched management team and endows managers 
with discretionary power to pursuit personal benefit. If the latter hypothesis is true, we 
should observe:  
H1c. After the 1995 ruling, the firm value of Delaware firms with a staggered board 
will be reduced when compared to control group. 
 
3.2. The impact of managerial ownership 
Equity-based compensation to top managers could serve as internal incentive to 
relieve agency problems, as it ties the interests of managers more closely to the value 
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of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) give a direct 
test to this hypothesis, and they find managerial shares are inversely related to their 
agency cost measures. When associating the cost with firm performance, Mehran 
(1995) shows equity-based compensation to top managers improves firm value in 
terms of Tobin’s Q and stock return. In a dynamic framework, Fahlenbrach and Stulz 
(2009) show an increase in managerial ownership leads to an increase in Tobin’s Q in 
the next period.  
As high executive ownership helps to relieve agency problems, it may serve as a 
complement to the control effect of market discipline (Jensen, 1993). Therefore, if the 
change in legal environment does increase managerial discretion, it should be more 
influential among low managerial ownership firms. As a result, if we measure 
pre-event average executive holdings and separate firms into subgroups, we should 
observe:  
H2. The entrenched behaviors on corporate financing and investment and value 
reduction are more significant for firms with low managerial ownerships before the 
antitakeover regime shift. 
 
3.3. The impact of institutional holdings 
A large body of studies on corporate control has noticed the monitoring effect 
from active investors. Among them, institutions play an important role, because their 
high amount of holdings will easily lead to economies of scale in monitoring, making 
the benefit of monitoring overwhelms its cost. Previous studies have confirmed the 
effects of institutional ownership. For example, high proportion of institutional shares 
is associated with high Tobin’s Q (McConnell and Servaes, 1990), better operating 
performance (Cornett, Marcus, Saunders and Tehranian, 2007) and high post 
acquisition stock returns that is recognized by the market (Chen, Harford and Li, 
2007). Also, Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that the presence of institutional investors 
increases pay-for-performance sensitivity of executives, acting as a relief of conflict 
of interests.  
    As a result, if the change of takeover environment leads to further entrenchment 
and high agency costs, we should expect its impact is greater to firms without or with 
less institutional monitoring. An illustration could be seen from Agrawal and 
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Mandelker (1990) and Borokhovich, Brunarski, Parrino and Harman (2006). Both 
papers study stock performance around firm’s adoption of antitakeover amendments 
and find that low institutional holding firms experienced higher negative abnormal 
returns. Our hypothesis therefore is: 
H3. The entrenched behaviors on corporate financing and investment and value 
reduction are more significant for firms with low institutional holdings before the 
antitakeover regime shift. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1. Data source 
We combine several data sources to construct our sample. Sample period is from 
1990 to 2006. Specifically, staggered board information is obtained from IRRC which 
consists of detailed corporate governance provisions of individual firm. The sample 
included around 1500 large US traded firms before 1995 and it expanded itself by 
more than 300 smaller firms afterwards. Totally, IRRC accounts for 90% of market 
capitalization of US stocks. Because IRRC is not published in consecutive years2, the 
missing data needs to be completed by hand. Follow Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
(2003), we assume that firms’ board structure would not be changed until the dataset 
was updated. Therefore, data of absent year is filled in by its information of previous 
year, e.g. board structure of 1994 is supplemented by that of 1993, and so on. Indeed, 
this could bring us measurement errors if the dataset cannot reflect timely changes in 
firm information. But since such errors should by no means be systematic, we expect 
our empirical results be consistent.  
    In addition, one critical issue in the natural experiment setting is to identify 
whether a firm had a staggered board structure around the year of exogenous shock. 
Our main measure of board information uses the IRRC data in 1994, which is one 
year before the regime shift. Namely, a firm is identified to have a staggered board 
only if such information is revealed in 1994. The same method is adopted by Low 
(2009). By doing this, we exclude the possibility of board structure change due to 
firms’ self-selection, because it is possible that firms switched to staggered board after 
                                                        
2 During our sample period, IRRC has been published for the year of 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 
and 2006. 
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1995 as they saw the impact of legislation on takeover protection. Another benefit of 
using 1994 board information is that it enables us to only include firms that survived 
right before law shift. That is, because of the data requirement of regression analysis, 
firms that did not have 1994 board information for reasons of either exiting early or 
emerging late are dropped. 
    Besides, information related to firms’ state of incorporation is also taken from 
IRRC. Among the sample, we observe that 167 out of 3816 firms are recorded as 
having reincorporated, while one firm switches its state of incorporation twice. These 
firms are not included in our study, because reincorporation is also likely to result 
from a self-selection process.  
In addition, accounting and stock return data comes from Compustat and Center 
for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP), respectively. Level variables, such as book 
assets and market assets, are all deflated by 2000 GDP deflator3. We do not limit each 
firm to have complete information for all years. The reason is that data loss from 
firms’ birth and death may bring survivorship bias. In addition, such constraint 
reduces our sample size by more than 50%. Moreover, we exclude firms in financial 
(SIC Code 6000-6999) and utilities industry (SIC Code 4900-4999), which is because 
the exposure to government regulations may bring them characteristics that are 
different from firms in other industries. Finally, matching all the above data sources, 
we construct a sample of 1227 firms, with a total of 15489 observations. We trim all 
the independent variables at both upper and lower 0.5 percentile.  
Since we also examine corporate decision among firms with different managerial 
incentive plans as well as firms with different outside monitoring effects, information 
on equity ownership structure are needed. On one hand, executive holdings data is 
approached from Execucomp. We measure managerial incentive in two ways. The 
first one is the percentage of top five manager stock holdings and the second one is 
CEO stock holdings. On the other hand, institutional holdings data is reported on 
Form 13F with the SEC, which is electronically accessible from CDA Spectrum. Our 
main measure of institutional monitoring is the percentage of shares hold by the 
largest five institutional investors. Chen, Harford and Li (2007) find that most of 
monitoring efforts come from independent institutions that do not have business 
                                                        
3 GDP deflator is obtained from DataStream. 
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relationship with the firm, so we use the top five independent institutional holdings as 
an alternative.  
 
4.2. Data definition 
We define variables to reflect corporate financing and investment decision, and 
the firm value aspect. Each of them serves as dependent variable in regression 
analysis. 
First, in the study of corporate financing decision, we follow Garvey and Hanka 
(1999) to define the adjustment of leverage ratio as the net effect of debt and equity 
issues, i.e.  
1 1
1 1
_
_ _
t t t
t
t t t t
Debt Debt issuance DebtLev
Asset Debt issuance Equity issuance Asset
− −
− −
+Δ = −+ +              (1) 
where Debt issuance is the net of debt issuances, derived from debt issues minus debt 
reduction. Equity issuance is the difference between equity sales and repurchases. 
Equation (1) essentially expresses the leverage change in time t as a result of net debt 
and equity adjustment in concurrent period, based on the previous leverage level. 
Furthermore, as theory of managerial entrenchment provides explicit prediction on 
debt usage of managers, we also use Debt issuance as dependent variable instead of 
examining the aggregate effect of debt and equity issuance. 
    Second, following Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), we use capital 
expenditure (scaled by assets) as our main proxy in examining investment behavior. It 
presents total cash outflow for the use of Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE). 
Besides, Richardson (2005) suggests that agency problem is more intensively 
reflected the abnormal component of investment, which is derived as subtracting 
expected investment from the realized level.4 We take it as an alternative test. Still, 
we also study acquisition behavior. However, one problem is that acquisition does not 
happen frequently in each year, so the acquisition expense item in Compustat may not 
provide sufficient information for DDD analysis.5 Therefore, we obtain acquisition 
information from SDC Platinum. We identify all acquisition for each firm, regardless 
                                                        
4 The definition of unexpected investment and its derivation will be given in Section 5.2.  
5  In the DDD analysis, the creation of various dummy interaction terms raises rigorous requirement on 
information containing of the model. Otherwise, if the dependent variable fails to provide much information, it is 
likely that we will meet multi-collinearity problem. 
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of whether the value of transaction is disclosed or not. The count of acquisition 
attempts is then used as dependent variable, and the model is specified below.  
Finally, firm value is measured by Tobin’s Q that defined as market value of 
assets over book assets. Market value of assets is calculated as book assets plus 
market value of common stock minus book value of common stock and deferred tax. 
Tobin’s Q reflects how the market evaluates the assets of a firm, especially intangible 
assets. Therefore, a high value of Tobin’s Q could result from a high market 
evaluation of the managerial dedication. Nevertheless, Tobin’s Q could be a noisy 
measure, as the market estimation of firm assets, especially intangible assets, is 
different across different industries. We also examine industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q as 
an alternative, which is calculated by subtracting firm’s Q by its 2-digit industry 
median. 
 
4.3. Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics, in which firms are divided into four groups 
according to their state of incorporation and board structure. The first column is 
treatment group, consisting of Delaware firms with staggered board. Firms in the 
other three columns are controls. As indicated by the last row of Table 1, the total 
number of Delaware incorporated firms is similar to that of non-Delaware firms (52% 
versus 48%). When comparing across the dimension of board structure, firms with 
staggered board account for about 60% of sample observations while firms without 
staggered board account for around 40%, and the percentage is similar both inside and 
outside Delaware.  
Then, we look at the three target variables in our study. Statistical numbers are 
with-group average of firm’s characteristic before 1994, so that they reflect the 
pre-event sample feature. First, the leverage adjustment rate for Delaware firms with 
staggered board is 0.33% per year before 1994 (ΔLev), which is higher than the 
middle two groups while lower than non-Delaware firms without staggered board. 
With respect to leverage level, treatment group is found to be higher levered, as their 
group mean of leverage is 27.75%. Second, all investment proxies are similar among 
four groups. For each sub-group, the mean of capital expenditure to assets ratio is 
between 6% and 7%, and firms on average involve in acquisition more than once per 
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year. Finally, regardless of being incorporated in or out of Delaware, Tobin’s Q of 
staggered board firms is smaller than that of corresponding non-staggered board firms. 
This statistics is consistent with previous findings that cross-sectionally staggered 
board is always associated with lower firm value.  
    Concerning other firm characteristics, we find that Delaware firms with 
staggered board have similar profitability (ROA), stock returns and undistributed cash 
flow, when compared with the other three groups. However, Delaware firms with 
staggered board are smaller in terms of total book value of assets than their 
counterparts, and they are slightly younger.  
To show a basic pattern of capital structure, in Figure 1 we plot firms’ leverage 
level against year. In order to make the graph more intuitive, we re-divide firms only 
into two groups, i.e. firm that in Delaware and with staggered board (protected firms), 
and firm that not in Delaware or without staggered board or both (unprotected firms). 
As it shows, the average book leverage is higher for treatment group across entire 
sample period, which is consistent with the findings of Garvey and Hanka (1999). 
However, starting from 1995, the gap has been shortened. Meanwhile, the general 
pattern of investment decision could be revealed from Figure 2, in which vertical axis 
represents the within-group mean of capital expenditure over book assets. While the 
investment ratio of two firm groups keeps close to each other in the beginning period, 
investment of protected firms goes up sharply around the year of 1996. 
 
4.4. Empirical methodology 
The Delaware’s mid-1990s validation of poison pill in conjunction with a 
staggered board completely immunes Delaware firms with staggered board from 
hostile takeovers and provide no protection to non-Delaware firms or Delaware firms 
without a staggered board. Therefore, we deem Delaware firms with staggered board 
as treatment group and refer to them as protected firms. Other firms are classified into 
control group and referred as unprotected firms. 
Our baseline regression uses the following specification: 
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where i indexes firm and t indexes time. yit is the dependent variable of interest, such 
as corporate financing (changes in leverage ratio, or changes in debt and equity 
issuance), corporate investment (capital expenditure and the occurrence of M&A), 
and firm value (Tobin’s Q). Delawarei is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm 
is incorporated in Delaware. Staggeredi is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm 
has a staggered board structure. After is a dummy variable indicating whether an 
observation is recorded after the year of 1995, exclusively. Xit is a vector of control 
variables, which is different according to different dependent variables of interest. The 
industry/firm and year fixed effects (FE_Industry/FE_Firm and FE_Year) are added where 
appropriate. εit is an error term allowing for residual heteroskedasticity and clusters at 
the level of state of incorporation (e.g. Peterson, 2007). This type of specification is 
common in the labor economics and public finance literature (e.g., Gruber, 1994) and 
is known as a triple-difference or DDD specification, since there are three levels of 
“differences”: Delaware vs. non-Delaware, staggered board vs. non-staggered board, 
and before vs. after the Delaware’s antitakeover regime shift in 1995. Rauh (2006) 
and Low (2009) use the similar specification to study the impacts of the Delaware’s 
antitakeover regime shift on employee’s holdings of company stock in 401(k) plan 
and on managerial risk-taking behavior, respectively. The coefficient of interest here 
is α123, which estimate the impacts of the regime shift on protected firm. The inclusion 
of (Delawarei × After) and (Staggeredi × After) allows the Delaware firms and the 
firms with a staggered board to have different levels of the dependent variable before 
and after the regime shift, for reasons unrelated to the regime shift.  Likewise, the 
inclusion of (Delawarei × Staggeredi) allows Delaware firms with a staggered board 
to have different levels of the dependent variable of interest from non-Delaware firms 
without a staggered board. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Corporate financing decision 
5.1.1. Basic regression 
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Studies on corporate financing decision of entrenched management predict that 
debt usage will be lower in the presence of manager’s discretion, so that debt issuance 
will be lower in terms of both amount and frequency. Our primary proxy for capital 
structure (yit) is according to equation (1), which follows Garvey and Hanka (1999): 
the change of leverage is a result of net debt and equity issuance. In order to make our 
result comparable to that of Garvey and Hanka, We first follow them to define control 
variables (Xit). Firm size proxies, such as Log(Assett-1), Assett-1 and ΔLog(Assett-1), 
are used to present scale effect. Previous period return on assets (ROAt-1) and the 
change in return on assets (ΔROAt) are considered as profitability measures, and a net 
income loss dummy indicates earnings condition (equals one if last year net income is 
negative). Previous year stock return is controlled for the possibility that manager 
target on market rather than book leverage. Beside, Industrial mean of leverage 
change is included to control for the cross-industry difference. It is calculated as the 
arithmetic average of dependent variable among firms within the same 2-digit SIC 
code area. Finally, lagged leverage level is added to control for potential leverage 
mean-reverting. 
    Basic regression results are shown in Table 1. In column 1, we control for 
industry effect, while in column 2 firm-level fixed effect is added. The inclusion of 
firm fixed effect enables us to drop dummy terms that consists of only state of 
incorporation and board structure, i.e. Delawarei × Staggeredi, Delawarei and 
Staggeredi. This is because all of the three terms are almost time invariant, so that 
they are perfectly correlated with firm fixed effect. 
Both column 1 and 2 demonstrate a negative coefficient of α123 which is statistically 
significant at 1% level. It indicates that compared to unprotected firms, Delaware 
firms with staggered board relatively reduced their leverage after the year of 1995. 
Considering the sample average leverage ratio was 26.7% before 1995, the magnitude 
of α123 (-0.09 in column 1) implies a downward leverage adjustment by around 3.4 
percentage. Therefore, if the regime shift was the only driven of such adjustment, the 
result would be consistent with agency cost prediction of Jensen (1986): managers 
would like to avoid debt to increase their financing discretion, and they would do so 
when market discipline was weak.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
    This result is robust under various tests, although for space reason we do not 
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report them in tables. First, as noted by Low (2009), the change of Delaware takeover 
environment was likely to occur across a period of time rather than a clear event date. 
The potential effective time spanned from the beginning to the end of 1995. To 
account for this, we redefine the event year as 1994 so that dummy variable After 
equals one after the year of 1994 instead of 1995.  
    Second, we adopt different sampling method to avoid selection bias. Concerning 
firm’s entry and exit effect, we follow Garvey and Hanka (1999) to include firms in 
the sample only if they exit throughout the pre-event period6. However, all results do 
not alter under this specification. Besides, it is noticed that our sample is not balanced 
in terms of pre- and post- event period, i.e. 5-year pre-event vs. 12-year post-event 
period. Thus, we also curtail our sample period to only include the time span from 
1990 to 2000 with 1995 as the effective date. Still, the industry fixed effect model 
shows a very consistent result as before, although a1 in the firm fixed effect regression 
becomes insignificant. 
Finally, as it is likely that manage targets on market leverage, we also replace it 
as dependent variable. The definition of change in market leverage is similar to that of 
book leverage in equation (1), except book assets is substituted with market assets. In 
the unreported result, we still find a downward market leverage adjustment for 
Delaware firms with staggered board. 
 
5.1.2. Robustness tests 
Above analysis closely follows Garvey and Hanka (1999). Besides, we add 
additional controls to leverage adjustment specification, with which we further prove 
the robustness of agency cost in capital structure adjustment. 
Adjustment Cost 
    Studies on dynamic capital rebalancing conclude that firms may not achieve 
first-best capital structure in the presence of transaction cost (e.g. Leary and Roberts, 
2005). That is, managers might not choose to rebalance leverage level, if adjustment 
cost overweighs the following benefit. As found in our sample, the credit rating of 
treatment firms is better than that of their counterpart. With such difference, it is likely 
that control firms will not adjust leverage after regime shift only for reasons that such 
                                                        
6 However, we do not require firms to exist after 1995. Otherwise, survivorship bias could be aroused. 
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adjustment is costly.  
    Thus, we add debt and equity issuance cost as additional controls in equation (2). 
On one hand, a credit rating dummy is adopted as proxy of debt issuance cost. We 
follow Frank and Goyal (2003) to define rating dummy as one if either Compustat 
item Domestic Issuer Credit Rating or Subordinated Debt Rating is below 13 
(investment grade), and it equals zero if both rating items are above 13 or both of 
them are missing. In this way, a higher value of rating dummy will imply a lower debt 
issuance cost. On the other hand, we use firm’s annual average stock turnover as 
proxy of costs related to net equity issuance. Leary and Roberts (2005) argue that 
stock turnover could be one proxy for equity repurchases cost, because higher 
turnover indicates that firms can easily buy back stocks. Overall, we predict that a 
greater value of either credit rating dummy (easy debt issuance) or turnover (easy 
stock repurchase) will result in higher leverage ratio. 
    As shown in column 3 of Table 2, both the additional variables are significant at 
1% level. The coefficient of credit rating is positive, indicating that lower debt 
issuance cost leads to a higher usage of debt in capital structure, when other things 
being equal. In contrast, turnover is negatively correlated to leverage, which is 
inconsistent with the prediction. One explanation is that turnover ratio does not only 
reflect repurchases cost. Bharath, Pasquariello and Wu (2009) show that since stock 
turnover is associated to market liquidity, i.e. higher turnover means less information 
asymmetry, it thus has a negative relationship with leverage as firms with less 
information asymmetry are able to issue higher equity at low cost. Noticeably, the 
negative consequence of takeover impediment on leverage ratio still holds without 
losing any economic or statistical significance. 
Leverage trade-off and pecking order hypothesis   
    As shown in Figure 1, leverage level for the treatment group was always higher 
than that of the control group. It is possible that the downward leverage adjustment 
for Delaware-staggered board firms only reflected firms’ efforts in returning debt ratio 
to what is ‘optimal’, as it is suggested by leverage trade-off theory. Thus, by assuming 
the existent of target leverage, we add the deviation of leverage as control.  
    The definition of leverage deviation follows Fama and French (2002). Deviation 
at time t equals the difference between firm’s target (TLt) and actual lagged leverage 
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Lt-1. TLt is obtained as the fitted value of equation (3) below:  
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where Lt is actual leverage ratio, DEPREit is depreciation, PPEit is tangible assets, 
R&Dit is R&D expense. Because R&D expenses are reported as missing for more 
than 50% of firms-year observations, we replace them as zero and correspondingly 
add a R&D missing dummy in the model. All variables are scaled by book assets. 
Lagged industry median leverage (using 2-digit SIC code) is added to control for 
industrial characteristics (e.g. Flannery and Rangan, 2005). Firm fixed effect controls 
for unobservables that cannot be explained by traditional variables (e.g. Flannery and 
Rangan, 2005; Lemmon, Roberts and Zender, 2008). 
    Next, we also consider implications from pecking order theory (Myers 1984, 
Myers and Majluf 1984). It says that because of information asymmetry, firms will 
choose to issue debt before equity when internal financing is inadequate. Indeed, our 
concern comes from the sample observation that Non-Delaware-staggered board firms 
faced a more serious financial deficit condition (defined below) than Delaware firms 
with staggered board, after the year of 1995. If pecking order theory is true, firms in 
control group would be expected to use more debt in capital structure decision. Thus, 
the relative decreased leverage for treatment group might be only due to their relative 
loosened financing situation. Hence, we incorporate a financial deficit (DEFit) 
variable as control. It is defined from Frank and Goyal (2003):  
it it it it itDEF DIV INV W CASH= + + Δ −                                          (4) 
where DIVit represents cash dividend, INVit represents net investment, ΔWit is change 
in working capital and CASHit is cash flow after interest and taxes. All variables are 
scaled by book assets. 
    Both proxies of leverage deviation and financial deficit are added into the 
regression. Result that combines both trade-off and peck order consideration is shown 
in column 4 of Table 2. Coefficients of leverage deviation and financial deficit are 
significant at 1% level. On one hand, the coefficient of leverage deviation equal 0.036. 
It indicates that firms do positively adjust their capital structure toward some target: a 
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one unit of downward departure of actual leverage from optimal will be reversed by 
3.6% in the next period. The adjustment speed is lower than that in Fama and French 
(which is 7% - 15% per year), because our definition of dependent variable is not 
identical. However, it is consistent with our concern that part of the leverage decrease 
for protected firms is not related to the regime shift, but rather it is raised by the fact 
that Delaware-staggered board firms have a higher level of pre-event leverage. On the 
other hand, the coefficient of DEFit implies an even stronger impact on determining 
leverage adjustment, i.e. increasing one unit of financial deficit will let leverage 
adjustment to increase by 14.4%. 
    Compared to column 1, column 4 shows an improved explanatory power to the 
model that R-square increases from 0.26 to 0.32. Nevertheless, despite the newly 
added controls, our main hypothesis of agency cost cannot be rejected. Although the 
coefficient of α123 decreases to 6 percentage point, it is still significant at 5% level. 
The robustness of our result shows that Delaware firms with staggered board did 
reduce their leverage level, when they were protected by antitakeover provisions 
5.1.3. Debt and equity issuance 
A direct testable hypothesis of agency cost of capital structure lies in corporate 
debt policy, i.e. entrenched managers tend to avoid debt usage. Therefore, only 
looking at firms’ leverage adjustment may not be enough, because a decreasing in 
leverage could either result from a decrease in debt level or from an increase in equity. 
As a result, we study debt and equity behavior separately. Dependent variable is 
substituted by either net debt or equity issuance (both are scaled by book assets), 
while we keep control variables the same as before. In Table 3, our hypothesis of 
agency cost is confirmed by the fact that that Delaware firms with staggered board 
relatively decrease their debt usage by 0.008 after the law (column 1). In contrast, 
equity issuance is also raised by 0.007 correspondingly (column 2), which indicates 
that the increase in equity issuance does help to explain a downward adjustment of 
leverage ratio for treatment firms. 
    Still, we control for issuance cost, leverage deviation and financial deficit in debt 
/ equity issuance regression, whose result is shown in the last two columns. All of 
additional controls are significant at 1% level. One interesting thing is that the 
coefficient of financial deficit (DEFit) in column 3 is comparable to that of Frank and 
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Goyal (2003). Although the magnitude of DEFit is far away from unit, it contributes 
much to explain firm’s debt policy. However, even after we control this situation, a 
significant decrease level of debt is still observable for protected firms.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
5.2. Corporate investment decision 
5.2.1. Basic regression 
We continue our analysis to study firm’s investment behavior around the regime 
shift. The model is still specified as that in equation (2). Our main proxy of 
investment (yit) is capital expenditure over book assets, as it is used by Pugh, Page 
and Jehare (1992), and Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). It reflects firms’ new 
investments in physical assets, the increase of which is possibly to be operationally 
inefficient under conflict of interests. 
    The presence of antitakeover provision protects managers from market discipline, 
leading to their discretionary investments. Therefore, we should observe an increased 
investment level for protected firms, according to the prediction of agency cost of free 
cash flow. However, one concern is that firms’ investment opportunities might have 
altered along with the regime shift, making the investment change not only a result of 
law pass. If so, we might not conclude agency cost story. Thus, we add Tobin’s Q in 
lagged period (Qi,t-1) to control for the change of investment opportunities. It is 
calculated as market assets over book assets, where market assets equal book assets 
plus calendar year end market value of equity minus fiscal year end book equity and 
balance sheet deferred taxes. 
    Also, literatures on investment highlight the importance of internal cash flow, 
such as Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Almeida and Campello (2004). This issue 
obfuscates our prediction of agency cost on investment, because we cannot identify 
whether the increase of capital expenditure is a result of over-investment or just a 
relief of firms’ financing condition which occurred simultaneously with the event. 
Alternatively, we might underestimate the impact of agency cost, as some firms would 
like to increase investment but did not do so in the presence of financing pressure. 
Therefore, we include concurrent period cash flow in the model, and it is derived as 
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operating income before depreciation minus taxes, interests and dividend of preferred 
and common stock (e.g. Lang, Stulz and Walking, 1991). It is also normalized by 
book assets.  
    Table 4 summarizes the result of investment regression. Column 1 and 2 uses 
either industry or firm level fixed effect to control for unobservable, and year dummy 
always presents. In column 3 and 4, Tobin’s Q and cash flow are also included. All 
columns show positive coefficients of the triple difference term, which are statistically 
significant from the level of 1% to 5%. It indicates that the removal of takeover threat 
enables entrenched manager to undertake extra projects, while other things being 
equal. The impact is not economically insignificant by any means. For example, the 
magnitude of α123 is 0.007 in the first column. Considering the pre-event sample 
average investment ratio for Delaware-staggered board firm is 0.066, the pass of 
legislation leads to an increase of capital investment by more than 10% for protected 
firms. In Table 4, the coefficient of Tobin’s Q shows a significant control effect, which 
indicates that investment had a positive relationship with opportunities. On the other 
hand, the coefficient of cash flow is very large in magnitude, implying that investment 
was constrained by firm’s ability of generating internal cash. However, adding these 
controls does not alter our conclusion on agency cost of investment.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Again, our result is robust under various sampling procedures as we do in the 
leverage regression section, including altering the event year to 1994, adjusting firms’ 
entry and exit effect, adopting a balanced sample period from 1990 to 2000. 
 
5.2.2. Other investment channels 
Aggregate investments and unexpected investments 
    Further, we check other channels from which entrenched manages could adjust 
their investment behavior. Specifically, we adopt different investment proxies as our 
dependent variable in equation (2), while controls of investment opportunities and 
cash flow are still kept. To reserve space, only the coefficient of triple difference term 
is reported in Table 5. 
    First, instead of capital investment, we aggregate total investment expenditures 
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into one item. It is defined as cash flow item capital expenditure plus acquisition 
minus sales of PPE7 and scaled by total assets. As shown in first row of Table 5, the 
result is still consistent. 
    In addition, as argued by Titman, Wei and Xie (2004) and Richardson (2006), the 
abnormal part of investment should be more related to managerial discretion. In 
contrast, if increased investment is foreseeable according to firm’s characteristics such 
as prospects and profitability, it may not have impact on firm performance. Therefore, 
we adopt the method of Richardson (2006) to separate out potentially discretionary 
investment from expected part. That is, we first regress total capital investment on a 
set of firm characteristics:  
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At each time t-1, next period investment can be predicted by the fitted value of 
equation (5). Therefore, the unexpected component is obtained as the model residual, 
and it is treated as dependent variable in the DDD regression, and the result is shown 
in row 2 of Table 5. The coefficient of triple difference term is significant at 5% level 
and its magnitude is even larger than that in Table 4. It indicates that our previous use 
of total capital investment could have underestimated the impact of weakened market 
control, which is because the change of total investment might still reflect 
contemporaneous shift in its expected component. Not surprisingly, since we are 
using the model residual of equation (5) as dependent variable, the explanatory power 
of DDD regression is low in the sense that R-square equals only 0.02. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Acquisitions 
    In studying agency cost of investment, acquisition is recognized as one of the 
most often used mechanisms by which entrenched management participates in 
diversification purpose investment (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Lang, Stulz and 
Walking, 1991; Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2007). Thus, it is expected that the adoption 
of antitakeover law would lead to increased acquisition attempts of protected firms.  
                                                        
7 Several studies on aggregate investment also include R&D expense. But since R&D is known to have many 
missing observations, we prefer to separate it out.  
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    We identify all acquisition activities from SDC Platinum.8 From 1990 to 2006, 
there are totally 6653 acquisition transactions relating to 813 firms that could be 
matched with our original sample. The value of transaction is either disclosed or not. 
Because of the missing value, OLS regression may not be appropriate for yielding a 
consistent estimate of legislation effect. Instead, we follow Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003) to adopt Poisson regression, in which the dependent variable is the 
count of transactions for each firm in each year regardless of the value. Independent 
variables consist of seven dummy terms that in a standard DDD regression as well as 
controls, i.e. Tobin’s Q and cash flow.  
    The marginal impact of regime shift on firm’s acquisition decision could be seen 
from the interaction effect, i.e. Delawarei × Staggeredi× After, the sign of which 
indicates whether firms will increase or decrease acquisition attempts when takeover 
threats are removed. However, one thing to be noticed is that while the interaction 
effect is proxied by the coefficient of triple difference term in a linear model, this is 
not true for nonlinear models, i.e. Poisson regression.9 Rather, we compute the 
interaction effect by following the nonlinear differences-in-differences method of Ai 
and Norton (2003) and Norton, Wang and Ai (2004). A simple illustration of this 
method is given in Appendix B.  
Row 3 of Table 5 represents interaction effect. The positive sign, although 
marginally insignificant, shows that Delaware firms with staggered board increase the 
attempts of acquisitions, after being protected against hostile takeover. If the 
legislation shift only enhanced entrenchment, such result will indicate managerial 
empire-building and risk diversification. The finding is consistent with Gompers, Ishii 
and Metrick (2003) that acquisition is positively related to entrenchment index. More 
often than not, agency cost of investment will bring in inefficiency of projects. 
 
5.2.3. Overinvestment or elimination of managerial myopia 
The DDD regression shows an increased level of investment for protected firms, 
which is supportive to agency cost hypothesis of entrenched management. However, 
                                                        
8 Garvey and Hanka study acquisition expenditure, using data from Compustat. But because more than 50% firms 
did not have acquisition expense in each year, most of the item’s value is zero. Therefore, the lack of variation in 
this expenditure item makes it not informative enough for DDD analysis. 
9 The reason is shown in Appendix B. 
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at current stage we cannot exclude ‘managerial myopia’ hypothesis by Stein (1988). 
That is, the presence of hostile takeover drives managers to emphasize current profit, 
while the removal of takeover threats enables them to take care of firms’ strategic plan 
in a longer term, so that managers may increase capital and R&D investment. 
Therefore, if antitakeover legislation helps eliminate managerial myopia, this in turn 
could also lead to an increase in capital expenditure level. 
    Although we cannot completely rule out this possibility, our result seems to be 
inclined to the agency cost story. First, in an unreported table, DDD regression is 
adopted to study the change of operating profitability (i.e. Δprofitability as dependent 
variable). Inconsistent with managerial myopia hypothesis, we find that increments of 
both ROA and ROE decreased for treatment firms after 1995, indicating that the 
marginal investment is performance destroying than enhancing.  
    Alternatively, we directly test investment behavior under agency cost of free cash 
flow (Jensen, 1986). Specifically, we examine the impact of regime shift on firms 
with different investment opportunities and cash reserves. On one hand, Cash reserves 
grants managerial discretion and increases the probability of wasteful projects, 
because manager with substantial internal cash is allowed to make investments that 
they may not otherwise be financed from capital market. Direct evidence could be 
seen from Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Vishny (1994). They study a sample of 
eleven firms that received cash windfall in the form of lawsuit and show that nine of 
the firms participated in acquisition subsequently. Also, Harford (1999) finds the 
probability of diversifying acquisition is higher for firms that are characterized by 
cash-rich, and these acquisitions are always followed by decline in operating 
performance.  
    On the other hand, however, the increased discretion may not be value 
destroying if all projects are likely to have positive NPV. According to Jensen, agency 
cost of free cash flow is the highest if firm does not have good investment 
opportunities. He uses the example of oil industry between 1970 and 1980s as an 
illustration and says that when facing tremendous profits yet shrinking opportunities, 
petroleum firms tended to waste money on inappropriate acquisitions. 
    Therefore, we independently sort firms into 2×2 groups based on their pre-event 
cash reserve and investment opportunities. Then, DDD regression is adopted within 
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each subsample. The use of pre-event criteria allows us to distinguish the ex-ante 
potential of managerial discretion. Cash reserve is defined as cash holding over total 
assets10. For each firm, we average its cash reserve between the beginnings of sample 
period (i.e. 1990) to 1994 to reflect a general pre-event cash level. Investment 
opportunities is proxied by pre-event sample average of Tobin’s Q.  
    Table 6 shows the coefficients of triple difference term from separate DDD 
regression, and it strongly supports agency cost of free cash flow hypothesis. The 
increase of investment behavior is only found in high cash and low Tobin’s Q group. 
In contrast, none of the three other groups show a significant triple difference term. 
Noticeably, the insignificance of interaction term of other subgroups does not 
indicate a constant investment level of protected firms around the law shift. Rather, it 
means that investment did not change relatively between treatment and control firms. 
For example, Delawarei × Staggeredi× After is not significant in low cash reserve 
group, regardless of whether Tobin’s Q is high or low. It is possible that managerial 
discretion was restricted due to the limitation of financing, so protected managers 
could not over-invest even though the absence of market discipline allowed them to 
do so. On the contrary, within the high cash and low Tobin’s Q firm group, the 
coefficient of Delawarei × Staggeredi× After is significant at 5% level and its 
magnitude is much larger than that of when we use the entire sample regression. The 
explanation is that when future investment return is expected to be low, money is not 
supposed to be distributed on extra inefficient projects. However, a self-dealing 
entrenched manger would do so to reinforce his profits, so the relative investment gap 
between takeover protected firms and non-protected firms is magnified. 
 
5.3. Firm value 
With observed adjustments in capital structure and investment decisions for 
protected firms, we then test how the antitakeover regime shift have impacts on the 
value aspect. If agency cost leads to both financing and operational inefficiency, one 
would expect to see reduction in firm value when market discipline is weak. The 
negative relationship between firm value and managerial entrenchment is showed by 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) and Faleye (2006), 
                                                        
10 We also define cash reserves as cash over non-cash assets (total assets minus cash), and results do not change. 
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among others. But as the author says, potential endogeneity from a self-selection 
problem could exist to weaken the cross-sectional conclusion, as it could also be 
possible that managers of low value firms tend to adopt the corporate amendments 
that are in favor of entrenchment. In contrast, our use of natural experiment could 
provide a better insight of whether the lack of market control is value destroying.  
    Following previous study, we use Tobin’s Q as proxy of firm valuation. Control 
variables include logarithm of firm size and age, ROA, capital expenditure (scaled by 
assets), leverage level, R&D (scaled by assets) and R&D dummy (it equals one if 
R&D is missing). Moreover, either industry or firm-level fixed effect is controlled for 
unobservables, while year fixed effect always presents. 
    Regression results are summarized in Table 7. As shown in the first column, the 
coefficient of triple difference term is negative and significant at 5% level. 
Considering the sample average Q was 1.57 before 1995, it means that the pass of 
legislation brings Delaware-staggered board firms a relative value reduction by more 
than 10%. Such magnitude is similar to previous findings (e.g. Bebchuk and Cohen, 
2005) and it is remarkable in terms of economically significance. In addition, the 
result is robust when we control for firm fixed effect in column 2.  
    Besides, since the market evaluation of firm assets, especially intangible assets, 
is different according to industrial characteristics, comparison of Tobin’s Q 
inter-industrially may be misleading. Therefore, we also adopt industry adjusted Q as 
alternative measure of firm value. It is defined by subtracting firm’s Q by its 2-digit 
industry median. As shown in the last two columns, the significance level of 
Delawarei × Staggeredi× After decreases. Nevertheless, the negative sign still 
confirms value destroying effect of entrenched management. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
6. Can internal control systems serve as a remedy?  
The market for corporate control is restricted by legal issue, discretionary power 
of entrenched management increases as a consequence. However, we should expect 
the influence of takeover impediment be not identical for firms with other ways of 
corporate control. Could an effective control system serve as a complement, the loss 
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of market discipline may not necessarily lead to value destroying behavior. So the 
magnitude of managerial agency cost could be underestimated. Therefore, in this 
section, we group firms according to ownership structure, i.e. managerial ownership 
and institutional ownership. Different types of ownership reflect ways of corporate 
control. Results are shown in the following paragraphs. 
6.1. Executive equity holdings 
According to our hypothesis H2, equity based compensation drives managers’ 
interest closer to that of shareholders, providing managers higher incentives to 
achieve firm value maximization. Therefore, conflict of interests tends to be less 
severe among firms with higher executive holdings. To reflect the role of managerial 
compensation, we calculate the total percentage of shares that hold by top five 
executives, and then sort firms into two groups based on their average pre-event 
holdings11. In this setting, firms in the below median group are considered having 
more intensive conflict of interests, whereas agency problem is assumed to be 
relieved among firms in the above median group. Finally, DDD regression is adopted 
within subgroup, separately. 
    The use of pre-event average holding as threshold reflects the magnitude of 
internal control through contractual incentive. As noted by Zhou (2001), the time to 
time changed executive shares include systematic component described by contract 
provision, as well as unsystematic component which may not have impact on firm 
performance. Therefore, by averaging executive holding within pre-event period, we 
tend to obtain a stable measure of managerial incentive before the time when 
antitakeover legislation becomes effective.  
Dependent variables in sub-group regression are the same as before, as we study 
corporate financing and investment decisions and the impact on firm value. Control 
variables are the same as those in previous corresponding regressions. In panel A of 
Table 8, we only report the coefficient of triple difference terms for space reason. First, 
protected firms reduced their usage of debt, but the coefficient of Delawarei × 
Staggeredi × After is only significant within low executive holding group. The 
magnitude of debt avoidance (-0.013) increases by 60% than that of column 1 of 
                                                        
11 Time series averaging includes years from 1992, which is the first year of data availability in Execucomp, to 
1994 which is the last year before the pass of legislation. 
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Table 3 (-0.08). Consistently, we find the increase of capital investment, as well as the 
destroying of firm value, is only found in low executive holdings firms.  
Besides, as CEOs are the most powerful in making corporate decisions, we also 
use CEO compensation as reference to divide firm groups. The result is shown in 
panel B of Table 8, which is similar as before. We interpret this as follows: when 
provided sufficient incentive, manager may not behave in a way to reduce firm value 
even the lack of market discipline allows them to do so. Otherwise, manager’s own 
share will be devalued along the decrease of firm value.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
    Indeed, it is arguable that our result cannot distinguish the non-monotonic effect 
of executive ownership (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; Stulz, 1988; Cho, 1998). 
That is, concentrated executive ownership could serve as incentive to relieve conflict 
of interests. But when shares as well as voting power are highly convergent, managers 
may get more entrenched against hostile takeover. So the impotency of legislation 
effect could come from the fact that the law added no significant marginal benefit to 
managers who held a large number of shares and had already been entrenched enough 
to stay far away from takeover. 
However, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) find that greater executive 
ownership may have inverse impact on firm value, only when it reaches a high 
enough threshold. In contrast, the relationship between ownership and firm value is 
positive around low level of executive holdings. Therefore, if we only compare the 
results for low holdings groups to previous results when we regress on the entire 
sample, all abnormal performances are more remarkable in absolute value. It confirms 
the impact of executive ownership on convergence of interest, when such ownership 
is low. 
 
6.2. Institutional monitoring 
We test whether the existence of institutional shareholders could serve as a relief 
to agency problem. Large institutions could play an active role in monitoring 
managers’ behavior, even though antitakeover provision exempts managers from 
market discipline. If so, we would expect that the monitoring effect could help offset 
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negative impact of manager entrenchment.  
    We calculate for each firm the top five institutional ownerships and divide firms 
into subgroups based on their pre-event average holdings. As noted by Chen, Harford 
and Li (2007), institutional influence is not a linear function of absolute value of 
holdings. Instead, there is a threshold above which influence of institutions will be 
significant. Therefore, we follow their study to divide firms into quintiles based on 
top five institutional ownerships and to define firms in the largest quintile as high 
monitoring group. Finally, DDD regression is adopted within each subsample, and 
results are shown in Table 9.  
    As shown in panel A, firms in low institutional group reduces their usage of debt 
when protected against hostile takeover. The magnitude is 33% larger than that in 
Table 2. In contrast, firms under intensive monitoring even increases debt level, 
although the coefficient is not significant. Also, the increase of capital investment is 
only found among low institutional holding group, while the regime shift has almost 
no impact on investment decisions of firms in the other group. With respect to firm 
value, antitakeover provision results in value destroying for all protected firms 
regardless of their pressure from outsiders. But the magnitude of value reduction is 
much larger within low monitoring group. 
    In panel B of Table 9, we sort firms according to the ownership of top five 
independent institutional investors. Our concern is that grey institutions, such as 
banks and insurances, may not exert influence on firms because of their business 
relationship. They thus cannot generate the same monitoring effect as that of 
independent institutions. The identification strategy of independent investors is the 
same as that in Chen, Harford and Li (2007). It includes all CDA Spectrum Types 3 
and Type 4 firms, and public pension funds among Type 5 firms. However, the use of 
independent institutional does not improve our results. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
7. Conclusion 
In 1995, Delaware Supreme Court validated the poison pill in conjunction with a 
staggered board, which completely immunes Delaware firms with a staggered board 
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from hostile takeovers. This paper adopts this mid-1990s antitakeover regime shift as 
an exogenous shock to study impacts of takeover impediments on managers’ 
corporate financing and investment decisions, as well as implications on firm value. 
Our empirical results show that when shielded from hostile takeovers, managers will 
decrease the use of debt and increase corporate investment, which leads to a reduction 
of firm value. Furthermore, the value destroying behaviors are more pronounced in 
firms that lack of internal control systems such as low managerial ownerships and 
institutional holdings. Our results lend supports to models of capital structure with 
managerial entrenchment, Jensen (1986)’s agency theory of free cash flows and 
Jensen (1993)’s views that effective internal control systems can serve as remedies of 
weak capital market controls. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A. Variable definition 
In this study, staggered board and state of incorporation information come from Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). 
Accounting and stock information come from Compustat and Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP), respectively. Acquisition 
information comes from SDC Platinum. Executive Compensation is from Execucomp, and Institutional holdings from CDA Spectrum. All level 
variables, such as book and market assets, are deflated by 2000 GDP deflator.  
Table A1. Definition of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Dummy Variables constituting Differences-in-Differences-in-Differences term 
Delawarei Delawarei =1 if firm is incorporated in Delaware 
Staggeredi Staggeredi =1 if firm has staggered board provision 
After After =1 for years after 1995, exclusively 
Leverage Regression 
Debt issuance long term debt issuance (Data 111) + increase in current debt (Data 301+)  
Debt retirement long term debt reduction (Data 114) + decline in current debt (Data 301-)  
Net debt issuance debt issuance - debt retirement 
Net equity issuance sale of common and preferred stock (Data 108) - repurchase of common and preferred stock (Data 115) 
Total debt long term debt (Data 9) + debt in current liabilities (Data 34) 
Total assets Data 6 
  Leverage changet 
(dependent variable of Table 2) 
1 1
1 1
_
_ _
t t t
t
t t t t
Debt Debt issuance DebtLev
Asset Debt issuance Equity issuance Asset
− −
− −
+Δ = −+ +
 
 - 35 -
Leverage level total debt / total assets 
ROA operating profitability, Data 13 / Data 6 
Stock Return continuously compounded return calculated from monthly stock return 
Credit rating =1 if senior debt rating (Data 280) <13 or subordinate debt rating (Data 320) <13. Credit rating=0 if otherwise or both data is 
missing. 
Stock turnover 12
, 12
1
_ i i t s
s
yearly turnover T + −
=
=∑ , where ,i tT  is monthly turnover 
Leverage deviationt target leveraget – leveraget-1, where target leverage is the fitted value of equation (3) 
Financial deficit cash dividend + net investment + change in working capital – cash flow after interest and tax (from Frank and Goyal 2003) 
Investment regression  
Capital investment 
(dependent variable of Table 4) 
capital expenditure (Data 128) / Data 6 
Tobin’s Q equals market assets divided by book assets, where market assets = book assets (Data 6) + market value of common stock 
(Data 24 × Data 25) - book value of common stock (Data 60) - deferred taxes (Data 74) 
Cash flow operating income before depreciation (Data 13) - (income taxes (Data 16) - change in deferred tax (Data 35)) - interest 
expense (Data 15) - preferred dividend (Data 19) - common dividend (data 21) 
Cash reserve cash (Data 1) / Data 6 
Aggregate investment  (capital expenditure (Data 128) + acquisition (Data 129) - sales of PPE (Data 109)) / Data 6 
Unexpected investment capital investment minus expected investment which is the fitted value of equation (5) 
Count of acquisition number of acquisitions, including transactions with both disclosed value and undisclosed value (from SDC) 
Value Regression  
Tobin’s Q 
(dependent variable of Table 7) 
same as above 
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Industrial adjust Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q minus its industry median (2 digit SIC code) 
Firm age time span starts from the first yeas when price data is available at CRSP and ends at current fiscal year 
R&D R&D expense (Data 46), =0 if missing 
  R&D dummy =1 if R&D is reported as missing 
Ownership structure  
Top executive ownership sum of top five executive stock holdings divided by total shares outstanding (from Execucomp) 
CEO ownership CEO stock holdings divided by total shares outstanding 
  Institutional ownership sum of top five institutional stock holdings divided by total shares outstanding (from CDA Spectrum) 
Independent Institutional  
ownership 
sum of top five independent institutional stock holdings divided by total shares outstanding, where independent institutions 
are either CDA Type 3 or Type 4 or public pension fund among Type 5 firms 
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Appendix B. Calculating interaction effect in nonlinear models 
    In row 3 of Table 5, we adopt nonlinear DDD regression (Poisson) to show how 
the mid-1990s antitakeover regime shift affects firm’s acquisition decision. Because 
of model nonlinearity, the coefficient of triple difference term cannot be interpreted as 
marginal effect of the law pass on protected firms. Thus, the interaction effect 
reported in row 3 is calculated based on the method of Ai and Norton (2003) and 
Norton, Wang and Ai (2004).  
    First, we illustrate why the coefficient of triple difference term is not a valid 
proxy of marginal effect of law pass. Suppose the expected value of dependent 
variable y is a function as:  
1 2 3
123 1 2 3 12 1 2 13 1 3 23 2 3 1 1 2 2 3 3
[ , , , ]
( )
( )
E Y X X X Z
X X X X X X X X X X X X Z
u
φ β β β β β β β γ
φ
= + + + + + + +
=
   (A1) 
where X1, X2 and X3 are the three components of DDD regression and Z represents 
other controls. When ( )uφ  is a linear transformation of u , the marginal effect of 
interaction is simply the coefficient of triple difference term. But obviously, this is not 
true for nonlinear model, because neither '( )uφ , ''( )uφ  or '''( )uφ  is necessarily 
equal to zero.  
    To correct for this, the marginal effect of law could be calculated as follows. 
Here we only illustrate the situation when X1, X2 and X3 are discrete variables. One 
can imagine it as the three dummy variables used in this study, i.e. Delawarei, Staggeredi 
and After. 
 - 38 -
23
123 2 3 12 2 13 3 23 2 3 1 2 2 3 3
1 2 3 2 3
2
23 2 3 2 2 3 3
2 3
123 3 12 13 3 23 3 1 2 3 3
3
13 3 1 3 3
3
23 3 2 3 3
3
( )( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
(
X X X X X X X X Zu
X X X X X
X X X X Z
X X
X X X X Z
X
X X Z
X
X X Z
X
φ β β β β β β β γφ
φ β β β γ
φ β β β β β β β γ
φ β β β γ
φ β β β γ
φ β
Δ + + + + + + +Δ =Δ Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ + + +− Δ Δ
Δ + + + + + + += Δ
Δ + + +− Δ
Δ + + +− Δ
Δ+ 3 3
3
123 12 13 23 1 2 3
12 1 2 13 1 3 23 2 3
1 2 3
)
......
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
X Z
X
Z
Z Z Z
Z Z Z
Z
γ
φ β β β β β β β γ
φ β β β γ φ β β β γ φ β β β γ
φ β γ φ β γ φ β γ
φ γ
+
Δ
=
= + + + + + + +
− + + + − + + + − + + +
+ + + + + +
−
    
(A2) 
where Δ indicates discrete difference when Xs change from zero to one. For example, 
the first equality holds when we explicitly calculate the fitted value of Y conditional 
on X1=1 minus that conditional on X1=0.  
    Finally, the impact of law pass on protected firms could be obtained by 
calculating the fitted value of Y conditional on the eight terms implied by the last 
equality of equation (A2). For a comprehensive review of the method, please see Ai 
and Norton (2003) and Norton, Wang and Ai (2004).
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Table 1. Summary statistics of sample firms before 1994 
Data consists of firm-year observations with all complete Compustat, CRSP and IRRC information. Firms are divided into four groups based on their board structure 
and State of incorporation, i.e. the first group consists of firms that incorporated in Delaware and with staggered board, and the second group consists of firms 
incorporate in Delaware but without staggered board, and so on. Summary statistics are within group average of firm level variables between the year of 1990 and 
1994. Leverage change is calculated according to equation (1); debt issuance is net debt issues over book assets and equity issues is net equity issuance over book 
assets; leverage level is defined as total debt over book assets. Investment is proxied by cash flow items: capital expenditure, acquisition expenditure, sales of PPE, 
respectively. Tobin’s Q is measured by firms’ market assets to book assets and it is used to proxy firm value. Other firm characteristics are obtained from either 
Compustat or CRSP, and their definitions could be found in Appendix A.  
 Delaware firms 
with 
staggered board 
Delaware firms 
without 
staggered board 
Non Delaware firms 
with 
staggered board 
Non Delaware firms 
without 
staggered board 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Leverage          
Leverage change (ΔLev) (%) 0.33 -0.09 -0.14 -0.49 0.22 -0.09 0.51 0.00 
Debt issuance (over Assets) (%) 0.20 -0.09 -0.21 -0.48 0.34 -0.06 0.56 0.00 
Equity issuance (over Assets) (%) 0.29 0.00 0.61 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.32 0.01 
Leverage level (%) 27.75 27.00 24.23 21.94 25.80 27.01 28.18 27.75 
Investment          
Capital expenditure / Assets (%) 6.59 5.44 6.97 5.66 6.57 5.90 6.41 5.52 
Acquisition expenditure / Assets (%) 1.43 0.00 1.79 0.00 1.11 0.00 1.45 0.00 
Acquisition (attempts per year) 1.52 1.00 1.65 1.00 1.56 1.00 1.54 1.00 
Firm Value         
   Tobin’s Q 1.56 1.06 1.72 1.35 1.478 1.20 1.52 1.19 
Firm characteristics         
Size ($1,000M) 3.70 0.97 4.59 0.97 3.99 1.02 5.46 1.35 
ROA 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12 
Stock return 0.15 0.08 0.18 0.10 0.16 0.11 0.16 0.10 
 Cash flow 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 
 Firm age 23.16 20.00 21.98 18.00 28.00 23.00 28.58 22.00 
Number of firms 373 265 359 230 
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Table 2. Regression of change in leverage 
Data consists of firms-year observations with complete Compustat, CRSP and IRRC data. 
Dependent variable is the change in book leverage according to equation (1). Delaware, Staggered 
and After are dummy variables, Delaware =1 if firm is incorporated in Delaware; Staggered =1 if 
firm has staggered board; After =1 for year after 1995 exclusively. Industry mean of dependent 
variable is the average of leverage change of other firms in the same 2-digit SIC code. Loss 
dummy equals one if firms previous year’s net income was negative, zero otherwise. Level 
variables (Log(Assett-1), Assett-1, ΔLog(Assett-1) are deflated by 2000 GDP deflator. In column 3, 
we add adjustment costs proxy (credit rating and stock turnover) as controls. In column 4, we 
further control for leverage deviation from target and financial deficit, which serve as test for 
optimal leverage and pecking order hypothesis, respectively. All independent variables are 
trimmed at upper and lower 0.5 percentile. Standard error is reported as White robust standard 
error, and it is clustered in incorporation level. T-value is shown in parenthesis. *, ** and *** 
indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: change in book leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Delawarei × Staggeredi × After -0.009*** 
(-4.23) 
-0.008*** 
(-2.86) 
-0.009*** 
(-4.19) 
-0.008*** 
(-3.28) 
Delawarei × Staggeredi 0.009*** 
(5.78) 
 0.009*** 
(5.72) 
0.008*** 
(4.58) 
Delawarei × After 0.009*** 
(3.99) 
0.007** 
(2.37) 
0.009*** 
(3.71) 
0.009*** 
(3.89) 
Staggeredi × After 0.006** 
(2.52) 
0.006** 
(2.21) 
0.006** 
(2.67) 
0.004* 
(1.70) 
Delawarei -0.006*** 
(-3.34) 
 -0.005*** 
(-2.89) 
-0.005*** 
(-2.89) 
Staggeredi -0.004** 
(-2.49) 
 -0.005*** 
(-2.98) 
-0.004** 
(-2.20) 
After -0.003 
(-1.22) 
-0.002 
(-0.53) 
-0.001 
(-0.34) 
0.001 
(0.46) 
Industry mean of dependent  
variable (2-digit SIC code) 
0.300*** 
(12.88) 
0.283*** 
(11.01) 
0.296*** 
(13.23) 
0.272*** 
(11.10) 
(Debt/Asset)t-1 -0.052*** 
(-11.70) 
-0.172*** 
(-24.59) 
-0.053*** 
(-14.19) 
-0.040*** 
(-7.76) 
ROAt-1 -0.013 
(-0.90) 
-0.094*** 
(-8.61) 
-0.018 
(-1.32) 
0.008 
(0.90) 
ΔROAt -0.239*** 
(-12.44) 
-0.241*** 
(-21.26) 
-0.244*** 
(-13.62) 
-0.130*** 
(-8.34) 
loss dummy, =1 if previous year  
net income is negative 
-0.001 
(0.25) 
0.001 
(0.71) 
0.002 
(1.35) 
-0.001 
(-0.97) 
Stock Returnt-1 
(from CRSP) 
-0.004*** 
(-3.11) 
-0.003** 
(-2.20) 
-0.001 
(-1.31) 
-0.001 
(-0.54) 
Log(Assett-1) 0.002*** 
(3.37) 
0.002 
(1.20) 
0.001* 
(1.95) 
0.001* 
(1.96) 
Assett-1×106 -0.167*** 
(-4.28) 
-0.230** 
(-2.26) 
-0.180*** 
(-4.52) 
-0.178*** 
(-3.75) 
ΔLog(Assett-1) 
 
0.139*** 
(28.02) 
0.144*** 
(24.74) 
0.143*** 
(26.37) 
0.128*** 
(19.50) 
Credit ratingt   0.004*** 
(3.91) 
0.004*** 
(4.16) 
Stock turnovert×102   -0.043*** 
(-10.10) 
-0.040*** 
(-10.34) 
 - 3 -
Leverage deviationt    0.026*** 
(3.48) 
Financial deficitt    0.140*** 
(11.02) 
Fixed effect Industry Firm Industry Industry 
R2 0.260 0.370 0.269 0.321 
Num. of Obs. 11250 11250 11233 10201 
 - 4 -
Table 3. Regression of change in Debt/ Equity issuance 
Data consists of firms with all complete Compustat, CRSP and IRRC information. Dependent 
variable is either debt issuance or equity issuance (both scaled by total book assets). In the first 
two columns, independent variables are the same as that in Garvey and Hanka (1999). In the last 
two columns, additional controls are added for robustness check. These controls are: credit rating, 
stock turnover, leverage deviation from target and financial deficit. We only report the coefficient 
of key variables for space reservation. All independent variables are trimmed at upper and lower 
0.5 percentile. Standard error is reported as White robust standard error, and it is clustered in 
incorporation level. T-value is shown in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance level, respectively. 
 Debt issue 
(1) 
Equity issue 
(2) 
Debt issue 
(3) 
Equity issue 
(4) 
Delawarei × Staggeredi × After -0.008** 
(-2.55) 
0.008** 
(2.64) 
-0.009** 
(-2.39) 
0.006** 
(2.01) 
Delawarei × Staggeredi 0.007** 
(2.66) 
-0.005* 
(-1.77) 
0.007*** 
(2.86) 
-0.002 
(-0.89) 
Delawarei × After 0.011*** 
(3.51) 
-0.011*** 
(-4.48) 
0.011*** 
(3.65) 
-0.009*** 
(-3.68) 
Staggeredi × After 0.007** 
(2.12) 
<-0.001 
(-0.06) 
0.005 
(1.38) 
-0.002 
(-0.53) 
Delawarei -0.005** 
(-2.18) 
0.002 
(0.86) 
-0.004** 
(-2.04) 
0.001 
(0.30) 
Staggeredi -0.003 
(-1.21) 
<0.001 
(0.14) 
-0.004 
(-1.48) 
0.001 
(0.21) 
After -0.008** 
(-2.45) 
-0.007*** 
(-3.32) 
-0.003 
(-1.05) 
-0.008*** 
(-3.69) 
Credit ratingt   0.004*** 
(2.92) 
-0.003*** 
(-5.76) 
Stock turnovert×102   -0.040*** 
(-9.33) 
0.050*** 
(11.98) 
Leverage deviationt   0.034** 
(2.62) 
0.029*** 
(2.80) 
Financial deficitt   0.235*** 
(15.22) 
0.136*** 
(13.32) 
Other controls variables 
in Garvey and Hanka (1999) 
Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Fixed effect Industry Industry Industry Industry 
R2 0.327 0.240 0.428 0.298 
Num. of Obs. 11250 11250 10201 10201 
 - 5 -
Table 4. Regression of Investment 
Data consists of firms with all complete Compustat, CRSP and IRRC information. Dependent 
variable is the measure of capital investment, which is calculated as capital expenditure over total 
book assets. In the first two columns, DDD regression is adopted with industry level and firm 
level fixed effect, respectively. In the last two columns, we add additional controls that include 
beginning-of-period market to book assets and current period undistributed cash flow. All 
independent variables are trimmed at upper and lower 0.5% level. Standard error is reported as 
White robust standard error, and it is clustered in incorporation level. T-value is shown in 
parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
Dependent Variable:  
Investment 
Delawarei × Staggeredi × After 0.007*** 
(3.00) 
0.007** 
(2.51) 
0.005** 
(2.00) 
0.007** 
(2.28) 
Delawarei × Staggeredi -0.010*** 
(-4.65) 
 -0.009*** 
(-3.78) 
 
Delawarei × After -0.005* 
(-1.86) 
-0.005* 
(-1.80) 
-0.004* 
(-1.73) 
-0.005* 
(-1.91) 
Staggeredi × After -0.005* 
(-1.91) 
-0.003 
(-1.12) 
-0.003 
(-1.36) 
-0.003 
(-1.02) 
Delawarei 0.009*** 
(3.51) 
 0.009*** 
(3.82) 
 
Staggeredi 0.006*** 
(2.90) 
 0.006*** 
(2.63) 
 
After -0.012*** 
(-3.11) 
-0.015*** 
(-4.18) 
-0.013*** 
(-3.49) 
-0.015*** 
(-4.70) 
Tobin’s Q t-1   0.005*** 
(7.10) 
0.006*** 
(7.44) 
Cash Flowt    0.084*** 
(3.38) 
0.023 
(0.74) 
Fixed effect Industry, Year Firm, Year Industry, Year Firm, Year 
R2 0.331 0.621 0.336 0.630 
Num. of Obs. 13202 13202 13202 13202 
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Table 5. Regression of other Investments 
Data consists of firms with all complete Compustat, CRSP and IRRC information. In the first row, 
dependent variable is total investment, which is calculated as capital expenditure plus acquisition 
minus sales of PPE and then scaled by book assets. In row 2, dependent variable is the portion of 
unexpected investment. In row 3, dependent variable is the count of acquisition for each firm in 
each year and maximum likelihood Poisson regression is adopt to study the probability of 
acquisition. In each regression, independent variables consist of seven dummy terms in DDD 
regression plus control variables, i.e. beginning-of-period market to book assets and current period 
undistributed cash flow. In the first two rows, interaction effect is simply the coefficient of triple 
difference term in DDD regression i.e. Delawarei × Staggeredi × After, and standard error is 
reported as White robust standard error, clustered in incorporation level. In the last row, interaction 
effect is calculated using the nonlinear DDD method of Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton, Wang 
and Ai (2004), and standard error is bootstrapped with 1000 replications. All independent variables 
are trimmed at upper and lower 0.5% level. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance 
level, respectively. 
Dependent Variable Interaction effect Model R2 Num. of Obs. 
Aggregate investment 0.023* 
(1.81) 
OLS 0.102 13202 
Unexpected investment 0.010** 
(2.13) 
OLS 0.002 11301 
Acquisition 0.249 
(1.53) 
Poisson - 3634 
 - 7 -
Table 6. Investment regression by Tobin’s Q and cash reserve group 
Data consists of firms with all complete Compustat, CRSP and IRRC information. Dependent 
variable is the measure of capital investment, which is calculated as capital expenditure over total 
book assets. We independently sort firms into four groups based on their pre-1994 (inclusive) 
average Tobin’s Q and cash reserve. DDD regression is then adopted within each group. All the 
control variables are the same as those in Table 4, yet we only report the coefficient of 
triple-difference term. Standard error is reported as White robust standard error, and it is clustered 
in incorporation level. T-value is shown in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance level, respectively. 
 Low Cash Reserve High Cash Reserve 
 Low Tobin’s 
Q 
High Tobin’s 
Q 
Low Tobin’s 
Q 
High Tobin’s 
Q 
Delawarei×Staggeredi×After -0.005 
(-0.95) 
-0.005 
(-0.94) 
0.031** 
(2.21) 
-0.003 
(-0.60) 
Fixed effect Industry, Year Industry, Year Industry, Year Industry, Year 
R2 0.528 0.479 0.370 0.354 
Num. of Obs. 4218 2516 2203 4045 
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Table 7. Regression of Firm value 
Data consists of firms with all complete Compustat, CRSP and IRRC information. In the left panel, 
dependent variable is a proxy of Tobin’s Q that measured by firms’ market assets to book assets. In 
the right panel, dependent variable is industry adjusted Q. Independent variables are logarithm of 
firm size and age, ROA, capital expenditure (scaled by assets), R&D (scaled by assets) and 
leverage level. R&D dummy equals one if firms R&D expense is missing. Firm- and year- fixed 
effect are adopted to control for unobservable factors. All independent variables are trimmed at 
upper and lower 0.5% level. Standard error is reported as White robust standard error, and it is 
clustered in incorporation level. T-value is shown in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance level, respectively. 
Dependent Variable:  
Tobin’s Q  Industry adjusted Tobin’s Q 
Delawarei × Staggeredi × After -0.162** 
(-2.63) 
-0.138** 
(-2.50) 
 -0.108* 
(-1.83) 
-0.087 
(-1.58) 
Delawarei × Staggeredi 0.151*** 
(2.78) 
  0.131** 
(2.50) 
 
Delawarei × After 0.114** 
(2.29) 
0.097** 
(2.15) 
 0.059 
(1.14) 
0.048 
(1.11) 
Staggeredi × After 0.060 
(1.04) 
0.005 
(0.10) 
 0.054 
(0.95) 
0.010 
(0.19) 
Delawarei -0.081 
(-1.46) 
  -0.061 
(-1.14) 
 
Staggeredi -0.109** 
(-2.22) 
  -0.109** 
(-2.30) 
 
After 0.103* 
(1.83) 
0.185*** 
(3.65) 
 0.080 
(1.33) 
0.024 
(0.45) 
log(age t-1) -0.052 
(-1.25) 
-0.021 
(-0.67) 
 -0.059 
(-1.37) 
-0.054* 
(-1.82) 
log(assett-1) 0.019 
(1.46) 
-0.109*** 
(-2.83) 
 0.022* 
(1.84) 
-0.115*** 
(-3.31) 
ROAt 5.868*** 
(16.36) 
4.389*** 
(18.12) 
 5.634*** 
(16.50) 
3.957*** 
(17.17) 
Capital expendituret / Assetst -0.234 
(-0.51) 
0.954*** 
(4.23) 
 -0.295 
(-0.68) 
0.787*** 
(4.17) 
R&Dt / Assetst 7.180*** 
(8.84) 
4.451*** 
(4.37) 
 7.258*** 
(8.72) 
4.716*** 
(4.92) 
R&D Dummy (if R&D missing) 0.053 
(0.96) 
0.044 
(1.08) 
 0.055 
(1.00) 
0.041 
(1.21) 
Leveraget -0.580*** 
(-7.66) 
-0.482*** 
(-5.76) 
 -0.532*** 
(-7.38) 
-0.345*** 
(-4.11) 
Fixed effect Industry 
Year 
Firm 
Year 
 Industry 
Year 
Firm 
Year 
R2 0.410 0.708  0.308 0.663 
Num. of Obs. 11031 11031  11031 11031 
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Table 8. Regression by executive ownership group 
Data consists of firms with all complete Compustat, CRSP and IRRC information. For each firm, 
we measure executive holdings by the percentage of firm shares hold by top five executives (Panel 
A), or the percentage of firm shares hold by CEO (Panel B). Then, firms are sorted into two 
groups based on their pre-1994 (inclusive) average executive holdings. The high holding group 
consists of firms with executive holdings above the median, while low holding group consists of 
firms with holdings below the median. DDD regression is then adopted within each group. In the 
first column, dependent variables are debt issue, while control variables are the same as those in 
first column of Table 3. In the second column, dependent variable is investment that calculated as 
capital expenditure over book assets, and control variables are corresponding to column 3 of Table 
4. In the last column, dependent variable is firm value that proxied by Tobin’s Q, whereas control 
variables are corresponding to Table 6. We only report the coefficient of triple-difference term. All 
independent variables are trimmed at upper and lower 0.5 percentile. Standard error is reported as 
White robust standard error, and it is clustered in incorporation level. T-value is shown in 
parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.  
Panel A 
Dependent Variable Debt issue Capital investment Firm value 
 Low 
holdings 
High 
holdings 
Low 
holdings 
High 
holdings 
Low 
holdings 
High 
holdings 
Delawarei×Staggeredi×After -0.013** 
(-2.21) 
-0.007 
(-0.79) 
0.010*** 
(3.08) 
0.002 
(0.25) 
-0.266*** 
(-3.77) 
-0.143 
(-1.15) 
R2 0.327 0.389 0.437 0.372 0.600 0.437 
Num. of Obs. 3771 3506 4491 4352 3822 3609 
Panel B 
Dependent Variable Debt issue Capital investment Firm value 
 Low 
holdings 
High 
holdings 
Low 
holdings 
High 
holdings 
Low 
holdings 
High 
holdings 
Delawarei×Staggeredi×After -0.009* 
(-1.94) 
-0.008 
(-0.90) 
0.016*** 
(3.47) 
-0.005 
(-1.03) 
-0.186* 
(-1.73) 
-0.093 
(-0.074) 
R2 0.335 0.374 0.372 0.423 0.557 0.440 
Num. of Obs. 4058 3787 4834 4720 4090 3839 
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Table 9. Regression by institutional holdings group 
Data consists of firms with all complete Compustat, CRSP and IRRC information. For each firm, 
we measure institutional holdings by the percentage of firm shares hold by top five institutions 
(Panel A), or the percentage of firm shares hold by top five independent institutions (Panel B). 
Then, firms are sorted into quintiles based on their pre-1994 (inclusive) average institutional 
holdings. The high holding group consists of firms in the largest quintiles, while low holding 
group consists of firms with holdings in the first four quintiles. DDD regression is then adopted 
within each group. In the first column, dependent variables are debt issue, while control variables 
are the same as those in first column of Table 3. In the second column, dependent variable is 
investment that calculated as capital expenditure over book assets, and control variables are 
corresponding to column 3 of Table 4. In the last column, dependent variable is firm value that 
proxied by Tobin’s Q, whereas control variables are corresponding to Table 6. We only report the 
coefficient of triple-difference term. All independent variables are trimmed at upper and lower 0.5 
percentile. Standard error is reported as White robust standard error, and it is clustered in 
incorporation level. T-value is shown in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance level, respectively.  
Panel A 
Dependent Variable Debt issue Capital investment Firm value 
 Low 
holdings 
High 
holdings 
Low 
holdings 
High 
holdings 
Low 
holdings 
High 
holdings 
Delawarei×Staggeredi×After -0.012*** 
(-3.64) 
0.009 
(0.87) 
0.007* 
(1.86) 
-0.002 
(-0.27) 
-0.165** 
(-2.54) 
-0.127 
(-1.05) 
R2 0.324 0.374 0.380 0.397 0.412 0.494 
Num. of Obs. 9124 2126 10740 2462 8864 2167 
Panel B 
Dependent Variable Debt issue Capital investment Firm value 
 Low 
holdings 
High 
holdings 
Low 
holdings 
High 
holdings 
Low 
holdings 
High 
holdings 
Delawarei×Staggeredi×After -0.009*** 
(-2.99) 
-0.005 
(-0.49) 
0.008** 
(2.39) 
-0.004 
(-0.65) 
-0.156** 
(-2.23) 
-0.244 
(-1.66) 
R2 0.327 0.365 0.364 0.462 0.428 0.458 
Num. of Obs. 9258 1992 10857 2345 9005 2026 
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Figure 1. Leverage pattern across year. The sample covers firm-year observations that have 
complete IRRC data and leverage information. Sample period is from 1990-2006. Firms are 
divided into two groups based on their board structure and state of incorporation, i.e. firms that in 
Delaware and with staggered board (Protected), and firms that not in Delaware or without 
staggered board or both (Unprotected). Y-axis represents book leverage that is calculated as total 
debt over book assets and is averaged within groups.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Investment pattern across year. The sample covers firm-year observations that have 
complete IRRC data and capital investment information. Sample period is from 1990-2006. Firms 
are divided into two groups based on their board structure and state of incorporation, i.e. firms that 
in Delaware and with classified board (Protected), and firms that not in Delaware or without 
classified board or both (Unprotected). Y-axis represents capital investment that is defined as 
capital expenditure over total assets and is averaged within groups. 
